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THE INCOME TAX AND THE STATE OF A UNION IN 
AMERICA 
by Cindy Lou Beale* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the hottest topics in American social and legal policy 
today is that of the legal recognition of the relationship 
between same-sex partners, whether it is a same-sex marriage 1, 
a civil union2, or some variation on the theme. 3 A host of legal 
issues now swirl around these couples, including: 
a. which states will recognize their relationships4, 
b. how portable are their new-found legal relationships 
to other states given how many states have declared 
these unions illegal5, and 
c. perhaps, most importantly, how secure are their 
relationships if one partner can simply move to a non-
recognizing state, thus effectively ending the 
relationship?6 
As with any new legal status, the legal ramifications of 
same-sex unions are legion.7 Considering the nation's political 
climate, the split among the states regarding the validity of 
same-sex unions, and the federal government's anti-same-sex 
marriage position as codified in the Defense of Marriage Act 
since 19968, the waters will probably remain murky for quite 
some time. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal and 
*Assistant Professor of Taxation & Legal Studies, Pace 
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demographic changes that have occurred since 1948 when the 
joint return was created as well as the assumptions and other 
motivating factors behind its creation and to determine if the 
continued existence of that filing status in our federal tax 
system is appropriate. 
II. MASSACHUSETTS SAME-SEX COUPLES' TAX-
FILING PROBLEMS 
Like most Americans, every year same-sex couples will file 
their income tax returns, federal and state (where applicable). 
Something as banal as this annual rite has the potential of 
throwing many same-sex couples into an ethical dilemma of 
the first order. For those same-sex couples fortunate enough to 
reside in Massachusetts and who have been legally married 
there, the situation on first glance seems to be pretty clear: the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue issued a Technical 
Information Release9, which provides that same-sex spouses 
(married on or after May 16, 2004) should file as married 
persons, jointl6' or separately, for Massachusetts state income 
tax purposes. 1 
However, since Congress passed DOMA 11 in 1996, each 
partner is legally required to use the filing status of "single" 
when he or she files his or her federal income tax return. 12 In 
Massachusetts, same-sex partners then face a risk of 
committing perjury when he or she signs his or her federal 
income tax return. 13 
There is no clear answer to this particular ethical dilemma. 
The situation, however, does pose at least one other issue: how 
relevant is the filing status of married filing jointly today?14 To 
be sure a taxpayer's federal marital status affects his or her tax 
liability in a variety of ways, but not always consistently or 
favorably. 15 Not only is the present treatment of the marital 
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unit inconsistent and inaccurate, but it is based on outdated, 
. d . 16 unexamme premises. 
III. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES SINCE 1948 
In 1948 when the joint return was established, certain 
assumptions prompted its creation as a response to perceived 
inadequacies in the system. 17 One of those assumptions was 
that the married couple had a "traditional" family in which 
there was only one earner in each family. 18 This assumption 
was not true in 1948 when the joint return was enacted because 
23.1% of all married women participated in the labor force. 19 
It is even less true today because in 2003, 61% of all married 
women worked. 20 
The 203% increase in the proportion of working married 
women working since 1948 is consistent with the fact that 
traditional families consisting of breadwinner dads and stay-at-
home moms now account for a mere one-tenth of all 
households?1 Furthermore, a record number of children-33%-
-are now born to single parents, many of them to 
underemployed, uninsured mothers.22 Moreover, married 
couples with children, which made up nearly every residence a 
mere century ago, now total just 25%--with that number 
projected to drop to 20% by 2010, says the Census Bureau23, 
when nearly 30% of homes will be inhabited by someone who 
lives alone.24 
Fueling this demographic change is the fact that more 
people are setting up same-sex households. From 1990 to 2000, 
the percentage of gay male couples with children increased 
from 5% to 22% and the percentage of lesbian couples with 
children increased from 22% to 34%?5 
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Also, unmarried heterosexual couples households have 
increased nearly 50% from 1996 through 2002.26 Heterosexuals 
are marrying later. From 1950 through 2002, the average age 
for first-time marriage for males increased from 23 to 27 years 
old and, for women, from 20 years old to nearly 26.27 Couples 
are also splitting up in greater numbers. From 1950 through 
2002, the percentage of divorced men increased from 2% to 
8% and the percentage of divorced women, from 2% to 11 %28; 
and more adults will remain unmarried. 29 
Finally, more Americans, on average, are living longer, 
which will make for an expanding population of widows and 
widowers as Baby Boomers age. 30 Meanwhile, more seniors 
are divorcing so they can qualify for Medicaid, while others are 
living together instead of remarrying to avoid losing their 
survivor pension or health-care beneflts.31 
Given this vast demographic shift and the very remote 
possibility of full federal and state legal recognition of same-
sex unions in the near future, time and energy would be better 
spent in changing our federal income tax system to one that is 
based on the individual as the more appropriate unit of 
taxation. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FILING STATUS 
CATEGORIES 
Before implementing fundamental changes in the system, it 
is important to examine some ofthe complexities involved in 
its creation. Prior to the enactment of the joint return, 
Congress examined alternative methods of correcting 
discrimination which arose in the treatment of family income 
under Federal income tax law. 32 
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From 1913 to 1948 the individual taxpayer was the only 
filing category.33 The language of the first income tax statute 
based on the Sixteenth Amendment imposed a tax "upon the 
entire net income arising or accruing from all sources ... to 
every citizen of the United States ... and to every person 
residing in the United States, though not a citizen thereof'.34 
The Revenue Act of 1916 explicitly taxed "the entire net 
income received . . . by every individual".35 
In 1918, Congress gave married taxpayers the option of 
filing their federal income taxes jointly36, but since there was 
only one rate schedule for all taxpayers and the rates were 
progressive, combining the spouses' incomes on one jointly 
filed tax return was disadvantageous.37 Accordingly, most 
married taxpayers who had two taxable incomes filed 
separately to take advantage of the progressive rate schedule.38 
One such couple were Guy C. Earl and his wife, Ella, who 
had signed a contract in 1901 in Oakland, California, in which 
they agreed to split all of their earned income equally.39 
Because there was no income tax in 1901, Mr. and Mrs. Earl 
were innocent of any tax avoidance motive40 when they filed 
separate tax returns in 1920 and 1921.41 Yet in March 1930 
the Supreme Court held in Lucas v. Earr'2 that Guy Earl was 
taxable on the full amount of his personal service income 
(salary and attorney's fees) and could not assign it for tax 
purposes to his wife, Ella, even though their 1901 contract was 
valid under California law, because Guy had earned the salary 
and fees.43 
In upholding Mr. Earl's employment contract over his 
marital contract, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl 
accomplished several things. First, it enunciated the 
assignment of income doctrine44, which makes it virtually 
impossible for a taxpayer with income from wages, salaries, or 
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professional fees to shift volitionally these items to other 
taxpayers, such as a spouse or a child, to "split" taxpayer's 
earned income and take advantage of the progressive rate 
schedule.45 Second, the Court clearly upheld Mr. Earl's 
employment contract over his marital contract, thus reinforcing 
the traditional common-law concept that legal ownership 
followed title.46 Without such ownership, Mr. Earl would not 
have had any income to assign.47 So, ownership and the 
concomitant dominion and control of the earned income that 
accrued to the owner at the moment he or she earned the 
income would ultimately determine the appropriate taxpayer in 
the marital unit.48 
The holding in Earl was put to the test a mere seven months 
later in Poe v. Seaborn. 49 A husband and wife resided in the 
State of Washington, a community property state, and their 
taxable income consisted of Mr. Seaborn's salary, and 
investment income and profits on sales of real and personal 
property.50 All of the Seaborn's property constituted 
community property as neither spouse had any separate 
property or income. 51 Each spouse filed a separate individual 
federal income tax return on one-half of the community 
income, which the IRS opposed, arguing that all of the income 
should have been reported on the husband's return. 52 
The Supreme Court held for the Seaborns, rejecting the 
government's theory that the husband's power to manage 
community proEerty warranted taxing all the community 
income to him. 3 Instead, the Court held that one-half of the 
community income was taxable to each spouse. Lucas v. Earl 
was distinguished as involving an assignment (under an 
agreement made by a married couple domiciled in a common-
law state) of earnings that would have belonged to the husband 
in the absence of the assignment, while in Poe v. Seaborn "by 
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law, the earnings are never the property of the husband, but 
that of the community."54 (emphasis added). 
Following the Poe case, the tax status of a married couple in 
a community property state differed from that of a married 
couple in a common-law state in two fundamental ways. 55 
First, each community property spouse paid the same tax as an 
unmarried person with one-half the aggregate community 
. b h . tur 56 mcome ecause t ere was one, progressive tax rate struc e. 
That result obtained in common-law states only in the unusual 
case of a married couple whose income was generated one half 
by each spouse and whose investment income, if any, was also 
equally divided between them. 57 Second, the federal income 
tax burden for equal-income married couples was identical in 
community property states, whether the income was 
attributable to one spouse or to both. 58 This concept came to 
be known as "couples' neutrality", meaning that couples with 
the same taxable income have the same incpme tax liability. In 
common-law states, since there was no couples' neutrality, the 
tax liability of equal-income married couples could vary 
widely, since it depended on the amount attributable to each 
spouse. 59 
The income tax advantages of living in a community 
property state for married couples soon became apparent, and 
there was a stampede among the states to change from 
common-law to community property states.60 Oklahoma and 
Oregon passed do-it-yourself community property laws, which 
permitted married couples to elect to be governed by the newly 
enacted community property systems of these two states.61 In 
the 1944 decision of Commissioner v. Harmon62, the Supreme 
Court ruled that these "opt-in" community property systems 
were substantially the same as the income-splitting contract 
between husband and wife that was held ineffective for federal 
tax purposes in Lucas v. Earl. 63 The Court went on to 
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announce that only a non-elective system of community 
property, "made an incident of marriage by the inveterate 
policy of the State," could qualify for income-splitting under 
Poe v. Seaborn.64 
The result of the Harmon case was that the community 
property system was effective for federal income tax purposes 
if under local law the couple could "opt out" (as permitted in 
most traditional community property states), but not if they had 
to "opt in".65 Oklahoma and Oregon promptly replaced their 
optional community property systems with mandatory ones, 
which were accepted as effective by the IRS.66 Hawaii, 
Nebraska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania also joined the 
community property parade, and by 1948 similar action was 
under discussion in states as far removed from the influence of 
Spanish law as Massachusetts and New York. 67 
Congress responded to the community property epidemic in 
1948 by deciding to authorize all married couples to aggregate 
their income and deductions on a joint return and to pay a tax 
equal to twice what a single person would pay on one-half their 
consolidated taxable income.68 This device was virtually the 
same in its effect on federal revenue as standing idly by while 
the whole country adopted the community property system. 
Enactment of the income-splitting joint return meant that the 
political credit for reducing taxes was concentrated in Congress 
rather than dispersed among the state legislatures. 69 Unlike an 
across-the-board cut in tax rates, the joint return could be 
supported as a way of terminating both the historic federal 
income tax disparity between community property and 
common-law states and the special opportunities for 
intraspousal income splitting that were available to married 
couples with income-producing property.70 
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While the enactment of the joint return produced couples' 
neutrality nationwide, it was not marriage neutral. Under the 
new regime, a married couple paid a tax equal to twice what a 
single person would pay on one-half their consolidated taxable 
income; however, if a single person had a taxable income equal 
to that of a married couple, the single person would pay the 
same amount of income tax as the couple. 
For example, consider Adam and Anna, a married couple 
with $50,000 of taxable income earned solely by Adam; Betty 
and Bob, also a married couple, who have $50,000 of taxable 
income, with $25,000 earned by each; and Debbie, an 
unmarried woman who lives alone and also has a taxable 
income of $50,000. If the tax rate is 0% on the first $10,000 of 
taxable income, 15% on the next $20,000 and 30% on the next 
$30,000, Adam and Anna, and Betty and Bob can effectively 
split their respective incomes as each couple is one taxable 
unit. Thus, each couple's total tax liability .would be $4,500: 
([$10,000 X 0%] + ($15,000 X 15%)] X 2, regardless of 
whether the couple had a one income-earner or a two income-
earner marriage. 
Debbie cannot split her income as the two married couples 
can. Instead, she is subject to the "brutality" of the progressive 
rate schedule and must pay federal tax of$9,000: ($10,000 X 
0%) + ($20,000 X 15%) + ($20,000 X 30%), or $4,500 more 
than her married friends who had the identical amounts of 
income-double their tax liability.71 This amount became 
known as the "single ' s penalty", and in the case of Adam and 
Anna, a "marriage bonus". 72 
The singles ' penalty was attacked on the grounds that: 
a. taxes should be independent of marital status, 
b. the disparity between the joint rate structure and the 
singles rate structure, even if partially justified by 
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the increased cost of supporting the breadwinner's 
marital partner, was excessive, particularly if 
account was taken of the economic value of the 
second spouse's untaxed household services, and 
c. similar benefits should be granted to other persons, 
such as widows and widowers with dependents, 
whose incomes also had to support two persons 
rather than one. 73 
In 1969, Congress responded to the continuing complaints 
about the onerous singles' penalty by creating a new rate 
schedule for unmarried taxpayers, under which their liability 
could not exceed a married couple's tax by more than 20% at 
any taxable income level. 74 As a result of this change, in 
addition to the singles' penalty, a "marriage penalty"75 was 
created, which still exists until today, although it has been 
eliminated in the standard deduction and in the 15 percent 
bracket through December 31, 2010 as a result of the Working 
Families Tax Relief Act of2004.76 
Since 1969, iftwo single people, each with the same 
amounts of taxable income, get married and continue to have 
relatively the same amounts of taxable income, the couple will 
pay more than twice the tax than what each single person paid 
in taxes prior to his or her marriage. 77 There is, therefore, a 
penalty on the act of marrying itself. Couples more likely to 
incur a marriage penalty are those with two earners with 
similar incomes, and those with higher combined incomes.78 
Couples are more likely to incur a marriage bonus where there 
is only one wage earner. 79 
Under 2005 's rate schedules80, if two single cohabiting 
taxpayers each had a taxable income of $100,000, each 
taxpayer would have an individual tax liability of $22,506.50 
for a total liability for the unmarried couple of$45,013 . If the 
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two single persons decided to and were legally able to marry, 
on their joint tax return they would instead owe $46,591.50, or 
an additional $1 ,578.50, the "marriage penalty/singles' 
bonus."81 
While the singles' penalty did not disappear in 1969, it was 
somewhat alleviated by the adoption of the new rate schedule 
for single or unmarried taxpayers. So, if a single taxpayer had 
$200,000 in taxable income in 2005, his or her tax liability 
would be $52,999 versus $46,591.50 for a married couple 
filing jointly, resulting in a "singles ' penalty/marriage bonus" 
of$6,407.50-a considerable sum and much more punitive 
than the marriage penalty in the prior example.82 As Scott 
Houser, a tax-code expert and economics professor at 
California State University in Fresno put it, "[f]ixing the 
marriage penalty is just going to make the singles penalty 
worse." 8 
The same tax liability would obtain for this particular single 
or unmarried taxpayer if he or she were (a) truly single (never 
married, divorced, or widowed and not a surviving spouse or 
qualifying widow or widower), (b) a partner in an unmarried 
relationship, heterosexual or homosexual, (c) merely sharing 
living quarters and arrangements as roommates often do, or (d) 
part of a nontraditional extended family that does not fit the 
definition of"head of household" under the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
Currently, the only legally available way for a particular 
single taxpayer to "avoid" the harsh single's penalty would be 
to marry an individual with no taxable income. So, if this 
particular unmarried taxpayer desired to and was legally able 
to, and did marry such a person, his or her tax liability would 
drop from $52,999 to $46,591.50, resulting in a marriage bonus 
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of$6,407.50 to the married couple (the same amount as the 
singles' penalty when the taxpayer remained unmarried). 
V. CONFLICTS BETWEEN NEW TYPES OF FAMILIES 
AND THE JOINT RETURN 
In light of the growing numbers of never married taxpayers, 
unmarried heterosexual couples, unmarried (at least for federal 
tax purposes) homosexual couples, the increasing number of 
divorced persons and widows and widowers (all of whom may 
have dependents)84, the joint return and its rate structure and 
their underlying theories are no longer appropriate. 85 
There have been numerous unsuccessful constitutional 
challenges to the filing status categories on the grounds that the 
classifications discriminate unfairly against unmarried 
persons. 86 The most recent challenge to the filing status 
categories as unconstitutionally discriminating against 
homosexuals unable to marry legally at the time came in 
Mueller v. Commissioner. 87 Mueller failed to file a tax return 
from 1986 through 1995 as a protest to his being limited to 
filing a tax return as "single" no matter what his actual 
relationship status. 88 He challenged the marital classifications 
in the Internal Revenue Code as discriminatory on equal 
protection grounds because he and his gay partner were legally 
denied the sanctions of marriage. The judge advised Mueller 
that Congress was the more proper forum for determining 
whether policy considerations warranted narrowing the gap 
between the tax treatment of married taxpayers and 
homosexual and other unmarried partners. 89 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, reiterating its decision in 
previous cases that the marital classifications in the Code do 
not violate the Constitution.90 
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In 1996, Mueller did file a tax return that he had completed 
jointly with his partner, Todd Bates.91 On the return, Muller 
listed his name first and Bates' name second, striking out the 
word "spouse" where it appeared in the label block of the 
retum.9 Mueller marked "Married Filing Jointly" as their 
filing status, but struck out the word "Married".93 Mueller 
claimed an exemption for a "spouse" on line 6b of the return, 
and claimed a standard deduction "based upon his claimed 
filing status of 'filing joint return. "'.94 Mueller also used the 
married filing jointly tax rate schedule.95 He had Bates sign the 
return on the line below his name, but again struck out the 
word "spouse" in the signature block.96 If Mueller had been 
allowed to file a joint return with Bates, they would have 
benefited from a "marriage bonus" of$1,897 in federal taxes 
because although Mueller was employed in 1996, Bates was 
not.97 
As DOMA had become law in 1996, in2001, Mueller 
directly challenged the definition of"marriage" in 1 U.S.C. § 7 
as only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife, for 
purposes of federal law, including the income tax filing 
categories, as unconstitutional on a variety of grounds, 
including equal protection, due process, separation of church 
and state, and the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. 98 
Mueller met the same fate in Mueller II as in Mueller I. The 
judge in Mueller II held that DOMA was irrelevant to 
Mueller' s case because no state recognized same-sex marriage 
or unions of any sort at that time, and consequently, Mueller 
and Bates were not and could not have been married.99 
Accordingly, DOMA's existence and definition of marriage did 
not change the law applicable to Mueller's case. 100 Mueller's 
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martial status was "single" as determined by state law and the 
court held that the marital classifications in the Code did not 
violate the Constitution. 101 While more sympathetic to 
Mueller's arguments than the judge in the first case, the second 
judge gave Mueller the same advice he had received 
previously; namely, that Mueller was in the wrong forum and 
Congress was the more appropriate body to consider Mueller' s 
constitutional claims. 102 Mueller II was affirmed on appeal. 103 
Notwithstanding Mueller I and II, the current focus among 
couples in same-sex unions is not on income-tax reform per se, 
but rather on continuing legal recognition of their marriages (or 
unions) both in their own states, as in Vermont, Massachusetts 
and Connecticut104, and possibly in other states. Also, gay 
advocacy groups are focused on the defeat of DOMA based on 
. . I d 105 b b f . constitutwna groun s , ut not y way o an mcome tax 
issue involving constitutional challenges.106 
VI. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
A somewhat novel approach has been suggested by the 
Supreme Court albeit not in an income tax situation. In several 
recent cases involving human rights as well as sexual 
orientation, the Supreme Court's majority opinion has looked 
to international law in making its decisions. 
In Roper v. Simmons 107, Justice Kennedy, held that the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment categorically bars caEital punishment for crimes 
committed before the age of 18. 1 8 Part of his analysis rested 
on the fact that prior to Roper, the United States was the only 
country that still permitted the juvenile death penalty.109 
In Lawrence v. Evans 110, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down Texas ' sodomy law on the ground that it violated the 
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right to liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. In rendering this 
opinion, the Court specifically referred to the European Court 
of Human Rights ("ECHR") 111 ; and, for the first time, some of 
the cases the ECHR had previously decided. 112 
In the wake of Roper there has been a very public debate 
about the appropriateness of looking to the logic of foreign 
courts to help untangle domestic legal questions. While Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg embraces this practice, stating that the 
United States judiciary should consider international law more 
often113, Justice Scalia (among others) lambastes it, saying that 
foreigners should not be given a role in helping interpret the 
C . . 114 onstitutwn. 
Given the increasing rate of globalization 115, and the recent 
forays by the majority of the Supreme Court in some cases into 
international law in deciding constitutional jssues11 6, it might 
be instructive to examine what other countries have done with 
their tax filing units and rate structures. 
Among the 32 OECD countries (for 2002), the dominant 
unit of taxation is the individual and not the family. 117 Joint 
filing is required in seven countries, and is allowed in six. 11 8 
The individual is the required unit in the remaining 
countries.119 And, finally, since 1970, seven countries have 
moved from joint taxation to individual taxation. 120 
As of 2005, Great Britain provides for same-sex civil 
partnerships and extends tax benefits to these new unions 121; 
the Netherlands provides for same-sex marriages for couples 
and registered partnerships for either same-sex or opposite-sex 
couples and also extends tax benefits to these new unions; 
Denmark also provides a registered partnership for same-sex 
couples as well as tax benefits; Portugal provides for 
71 1 Vol. 16 1 North East Journal of Legal Studies 
partnership rights for same- and opposite-sex couples with the 
extension of tax benefits; France provides a civil solidarity pact 
for same- and opposite-sex couples with the extension of tax 
benefits; and Germany provides for registered partnerships for 
same-sex couples without an extension of tax benefits. 122 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Sweeping demographic shifts have occurred during the last 
fifty years in the United States, especially the decline of the 
traditional family and the escalation in the number of single 
persons and nontraditional families. While Vermont, 
Massachusetts and Connecticut and an ever-increasing number 
of foreign countries have afforded some form of legal 
recognition for same-sex unions, including in most cases 
changes to the tax laws consistent with these legal changes, the 
federal government has refused to do so since 1996. This 
inconsistency between some states and the federal government 
at the very least creates conflicts and risks for same-sex 
couples in filing their federal income tax returns. 
The confluence of these domestic facts alone makes the 
continued use of the joint return and its rate structure and their 
underlying theories inappropriate. Combined with the changes 
abroad and the extremely remote chance of full federal and 
state recognition of same-sex unions domestically, Congress 
should eliminate the unfairness of using the marriage unit as 
the filing unit for our federal income tax system so the United 
States can remain a competitive force economically in an 
increasingly global world. The individual unit better comports 
with the current realities of the American way of life and that 
of much of the rest of the world. 
2006 I The Income Tax and State of a Union I 72 
ENDNOTES 
1Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). Except where 
specificity is required, the term "same-sex union(s)" will be used 
throughout this paper to refer to all same-sex marriages, civil unions, and 
any other legal recognition of a same-sex relationship. 
2 In the landmark ruling of Baker v. State, I 70 Vt. 194 (1999) the court 
ruled simply: "(T]he state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex 
couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under 
Vermont law"- adding that to do so is, "when all is said and done, a 
recognition of our common humanity." Id. at 226. As justification for this 
decision, the court relied on the state Constitution's Common Benefits 
Clause- specifically citing this passage: "(G]ovemment is, or ought to be, 
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, 
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of 
any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that 
community." Id. at 228. Lawmakers concluded that they would not open 
marriage to gay and lesbian couples but, rather, establish a parallel system 
of protections and responsibilities through the Vermont civil union law, 
which would become effective July I , 2000. (codified as amended in 
scattered statutes throughout the Vermont Statutes Annotated). 
The Connecticut bill authorizing civil unions between same sex partners, 
2005 Connecticut Senate Bill No. 963, was signed into law April20, 2005, 
and became effective on October I, 2005. 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp? 
se!BiiiType=Bill&bill_ num=963&which _year=2005&S UBMIT.x= ll &SU 
BMIT.y= ll. 
A bill that would have allowed gay couples in Oregon to form civil unions 
and that also would have given them many of the rights available to married 
couples, died in Oregon's Legislature on August 5, 2005 as the Legislative 
session ended without a joint vote on the bill. Associated Press, Ore. 
Governor Pushing for Civil Unions Law, NY TIMES, April 13, 2005; 
http:/ /www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Oregon l &CONTENTID=28279 
&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfrn 
3 On March 14, 2005, Judge Richard A. Kramer of San Francisco County 
Superior Court, ruling on Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 
73 I Vol. 16 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
4365 (which consisted of six coordinated cases sharing a common issue: 
whether a marriage in California is a union between a man and a woman 
even_ though California Family Code section 308.5 states that only a 
mamage and a woman is or recognized in California) 
ruled that California s Ban on same-sex mamage was unconstitutional. See 
also, Dean E. Murphy, Judge In California Voids Ban on Same-Sex 
Marriage, NY TIMES, March 15,2005 §A at I6. 
California became the first state ever to pass a bill to extend the freedom to 
marry to same-sex couples in 2005. Unfortunately Republican Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger vetoed this important legislation. 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section- Califomia2&CONTENTID 30 
358&TEMPLA TE-/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfrn 
California, New Jersey, Hawaii and the District of Columbia have official 
state/district registries for same-sex couples, available at 
http://www.glaad.org/medialresource _kit_ detail. php?id=3457 &PHPSESSI 
D=960699f92ed3d4 I (last visited April I2, 2005). 
See also, Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, "A Homosexual," and Frivolity: 
A Deconstructionist Meditation, 24 ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REv. 2I at 26 text 
note 163 and note I 55 and accompanying text (2005) 
[heremafter Cited as Infanti, Tax Protest]. 
4 E.l!·· See Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. I298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) where a 
lesbian couple, who had been legally married in Massachusetts sued the 
Unit_ed States General and a Florida court clerk, that 
Flonda was reqUired to recognize their marriage, and seeking declaration 
that ?efense of Marriage Act and a Florida statute withholding 
recognition for same-sex marriages entered into in Florida or elsewhere 
were unconstitutional. The district court held that Defense of Marriage Act 
(see note 8 infra and accompanying text) did not violate the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause nor the equal protection or due process guarantees, the right 
to marry a person of the same sex is not a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause, and the Florida statute was constitutional. I d. at II, 
13, and I4. See generally, Robin Cheryl Miller and Jason Binimow 
Annotation, Marriage Between persons of Same Sex-United State; and 
Cases, I A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (March 2005) (discussing the case Jaw 
m the U.S. and Canada on same-sex unions, as well as the Defense of 
Marriage Act). 
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5 Jd.; Joanna Grossman, Will Non-Resident Same-Sex Couples Be Able to 
Marry In Massachusetts? The State's Highest Court Considers the 
Marriage Evasion Law, FrNDLA W'S LEGAL COMMENTARY: LEGAL WRIT, 
Mar. 01, 2005. Professor Grossman discusses the Massachusetts marriage 
evasion statute, enacted in 1913, that Governor Mitt Romney bad 
announced his intention to enforce one month before the first same-sex 
marriage was performed in Massachusetts (which was May 16, 2004). Jd. 
The marriage evasion law requires, among other things, that city and town 
clerks cannot issue a marriage license unless and until they have seen proof, 
and are satisfied, that an out-of-state applicant is not prohibited from 
marrying in his home state. Jd. Eventually, the clerks statewide agreed to 
comply with the marriage evasion law. Jd. Subsequently, eight same-sex 
couples sued for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 
marriage evasion law, which was denied, Cote-Whitacre v. Department of 
Public Health, 18 Mass. L. Rptr 190, 2004 WL 2075557 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2004). Plaintiffs then requested a direct appellate review by Massachusetts' 
highest court, the Supreme Judicial Court, which request was granted. Final 
briefs are due in May 2005 and the case will be set for argument sometime 
thereafter. Jd. 
Professor Grossman argues that regardless of how the Supreme Judicial 
Court rules, it's time for Massachusetts to get rid of the marriage evasion 
law, by legislative repeal if necessary. ld. She states that for marriage to be 
meaningful, it must be portable to promote the stability of same-sex 
marriages. I d. For example, if the marriage evasion law is strictly enforced 
and (a) the Massachusetts married same-sex couple cross state lines, they 
lose the benefits and protections that their marital status had provided; or 
(b) one spouse in a Massachusetts same-sex marriage wants to abandon the 
other (and any children of the relationship) hassle free, the departing spouse 
need only move to any one of the forty states whose laws expressly prohibit 
same-sex marriages, in order to be relatively confident that the union will 
not be recognized and that the obligations created by marriage cannot be 
enforced. Jd. 
7 See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. 
8 Pub. L. 104-199, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 
U.S.C. §7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2005)) [hereinafter cited as DOMA]. 
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I U.S.C §7 (2005) provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or wife. 
28 U.S.C. §1738C (2005) provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship. 
9 Mass. Dept. of Revenue Technical Information Release 04-17, Mass. Tax 
Issues Associated with Same-Sex Marriage. 
10 Jd. Although the filing status question is resolved by Massachusetts' 
Technical Release, note 9 supra, the conflict between the federal and 
Massachusetts income tax laws have produced a myriad of unanswered 
questions (for example, are Massachusetts same-sex married couples legally 
allowed to transfer assets to the other spouse estate-tax free when one of 
them dies?) and additional work (a phantom federal tax return has to be 
prepared but not filed for the couple as if they were filing married filing 
jointly and the federal government recognized their marriage, in order to 
calculate their Massachusetts state income taxes [because in some instances 
elements of Massachusetts taxation may either derive from federal tax, such 
as the definition of gross income, or state deductions may be based on a 
federal counterpart] and to file the actual Massachusetts joint return, and 
then two individual federal income tax returns must actually be prepared for 
filing purposes-a total of four tax returns). Kimberly Blanton, With 
Marriage, Gay Couples Face Tax Tangles, BOSTON GLOBE, March 14, 
2005, at (Business), AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
The same headaches and risks faced by Massachusetts same-sex marital 
partners seem to prevail for partners in Vermont civil unions. For Vermont 
income tax purposes, civil union partners are treated as if married and must 
2006 I The Income Tax and State of a Union I 76 
file their Vermont income tax return as either Civil Union Filing Jointly or 
Civil Union filing separately. However because of the need for federal 
income tax information on the Vermont income tax return, just as in 
Massachusetts, the civil union partners must complete a Married Filing 
Jointly or Married Filing Separately tax return to use for that purposes. 
Finally, each partner must then complete and file an actual federal return, 
which under current law, can only be filed as single. 
http :1 /www .state. vt. us/ tax/pdf. word. excel/individual/ civilunions. pdf 
Connecticut's law does not yet speak of the filing technicalities for civil 
union partners. It does, however, seem to indicate that at the least partners 
in a civil union will be treated the same as if they were legally married for 
withholding tax purposes. 
http://www.ct. gov/drs/cwp/view .asp?a= 14 79&g=307384 
For purposes of this paper, tax returns filed as either married filing jointly 
or single will be the only ones discussed. All other filing status categories 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
See note 12 infra and accompanying text for the IRS' defmition of 
"married". See part IV infra for the historical development of the jointly 
filed return category. 
The terms "single" and "unmarried" are used interchangeably throughout 
this paper. A single or unmarried taxpayer includes a taxpayer who is (a) 
truly single (never married, divorced, or widowed and not a surviving 
spouse or qualifying widow or widower), (b) a partner in an unmarried 
relationship, heterosexual or homosexual, (c) merely sharing living quarters 
and arrangements as roommates often do, or (d) part of a nontraditional 
extended family that does not fit the definition of"head of household" 
under the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as IRC]. All references 
to IRC are to the Internal Revene Code of 1986, as amended. 
11 Supra note 8. 
12 See I U.S.C.§7 supra note 8. See also, Letter from the Internal Revenue 
Service to Eugene A. Delgaudio, President, Public Advocate of the United 
States, Inc. (June 14, 2004), ["The law is clear on this issue, and we point 
out the federal defmition of marriage when explaining 'filing status' in IRS 
Publications 17, 'Your F ederalincome Tax,' and 501, 'Exemptions, 
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Standard Deduction, and Filing Information. ' In both publications, we 
introduce the subject of marital status with this paragraph: ' In general, your 
filing status on whether you are considered unmarried or married. A 
marriage means only a legal union between a man and a woman as husband 
and wife."] available at 
http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/article.php?article= 121 (last visited 
April 9, 2005). For reporting on the letter, see Allen Kenny, IRS: Joint 
Filing Not Allowed for Same-Sex Married Couples, I 03 TAX NOTES 1466 
(2004) all cited in Infanti, Tax Protest at 24 note 2 and accompanying text. 
13 IRC §§6061-6063, 6065; Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon, & 
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation Oflndividuals at 
(Warren Gorham & Lamont Third Edition 2002) [hereinafter Bittker, 
Federal Income Taxation]. See also, E.J. Graff, Marrying Outside the Box: 
What happens when same-sex spouses face the I.R.S. ?, N.Y. TrMES, April 
I 0, 2005 §6 (Magazine) at 22 [hereinafter cited as Marrying Outside the 
Box]. 
14 The IRS seems relatively nonplussed by this issue: in Marrying Outside 
the Box, supra note 13 at 24, Eric Smith, an I.R. S. spokesman, stated: 
"Historically, filing status has not been a primary focus of our compliance 
efforts. The largest focus we have is on tax abuse, abusive tax shelters, that 
sort of thing." It should be noted that there is no place on the 1040 form to 
declare whether you are male or female since that's irrelevant to how much 
you owe. Jd. 
15 Some of the most obvious are as follows: (1) the joint return rate 
schedule IRC § 1(f)(8)(B) provides that from January 1, 2004 through 
December 31 ,2010 the upper limit of the 15 percent rate bracket for married 
couples filing joint returns is 200 percent of the upper limit of the 15 
percent rate bracket for unmarried taxpayers; (2) an exemption for taxpayer 
and for his or her spouse on a joint return IRC § 151(b); (3) the standard 
deduction on a joint return is twice that of a single taxpayer § IRC § 
63(c)(2) again from January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2010; (4) IRC § 
1041's tax-free transfers between spouses; (5) IRC § 121 's $500,000 
exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal residence from the gross 
income of a married couple filing a joint return (other taxpayers are entitled 
to only a $250,000 exclusion). Married taxpayers, however, are not always 
treated so favorably nor so consistently throughout the Code. For example, 
the capital loss limitation of$3,000 per tax year is the same for married 
taxpayers and individuals, IRC § 1211. See Philip J. Harmelink, Marital 
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Status Tax Discrimination After Tax Reform: Proposals to Resolve the 
Penalty/Bonus Issues, 26 WILLIAMETIE L. REv. 593 at 603-15 (1990) for a 
discussion of various treatments. His list is extensive, but is neither current 
nor comprehensive. It is very useful, however, for demonstrating that the 
marital unit is treated inconsistently throughout the Code by delineating six 
different categories that are related to marital status: (I) provisions treating 
spouses separately, (2) provisions giving married couples twice the benefits 
given single persons, (3) provisions giving married couples the same 
benefits given single persons, (4) provisions giving married couples greater 
benefits than single persons, but less than twice the benefits given single 
persons, (5) provisions subject to floors and phaseouts,and (6)miscellaneous 
provisions and biasing factors. /d. See also Marjorie E.Kornhauser, Love, 
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax 
Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, at 100 and notes 113-115 and accompanying 
text (1993) [hereinafter cited as Kornhauser, Love, Money, & the IRS]. 
16 Kornhauser, Love, Money & the IRS at 10 l. 
17 Kornhauser, Love, Money & the IRS at 101-02 and text accompanying 
note 122. Professor Kornhauser cites a 1947 Treasury Department report 
entitled The Tax Treatment of Family Income, which made no 
recommendations as to how to respond to certain perceived inadequacies in 
the federal tax system. It stated that it would merely "examine alternative 
methods of correcting discriminations which arise in the treatment of family 
income under present Federal income tax law." She also cites Toni 
Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: 
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REv. 773, 773-79 (1989) 
who stated that income splitting was adopted not out of ability-to-pay 
considerations, but out of necessity to stem the flight to community 
property law. But Professors Robinson and Wenig did recognize that the 
1948 change was " tax reform" to the extent that it reduced taxes for middle 
and upper class couples in common-law-states. Kornhauser, Love, Money 
& the IRS at 101-102 note 122. See part II infra. 
18 Kornhauser, Love, Money, & the IRS at 101-102. 
19 Jd. at 103. 
20 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, tbl. 578 (2004-2005). It should be noted that data for 1994 and 
subsequent years are not strictly comparable to prior years because of a 
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major redesign of the survey questionnaire and collection methodology. /d. 
at tbl 569 note 2. [hereinafter cited as Stat. Abstract]. The comparable 1993 
datum is that 59.4% of married women participated in the workforce. 
2 1 Michelle Conlin, UnMarried America, BUSINESS WEEK, March 20, 2004, 
at 106, 108 (hereinafter cited as Conlin, UnMarried America]. The 
"household" is the major unit ofc1assification in the U.S. Census and it 
consists of "all persons who occupy a housing unit. People not living in 
households are classified as living in group quarters." Stat. Abstract at A-2 
(2000). 
22 Conlin, UnMarried America at 109. 
23 /d. at 108. 
24 /d. 
25 Conlin, UnMarried America at 109. One can only assume that with the 
legalization of same-sex unions in Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut (as well as possible legalization in other states see notes 2-3 
supra and accompanying text) these numbers may accelerate. 
26 /d. at 108 and 110. 
27 /d. 
28 Jd. at 109. 
29 /d. at 110. This phenomenon is consistent with the fmding that a record 
number of children are born to single parents, text accompanying note 22 
supra. 
30 ld. 
31 Jd. at 110 and 114. 
32 See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
33 Boris l.Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 1389, at 1400 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bittker, Taxation and the 
Family]. 




37 Jd. If each spouse had $60,000 of taxable income and the tax rate was 
10% on the first $30,000 and 20% on the next $60,000, and 30% on the 
next $120,000 each spouse's tax liability would be $9,000 for a total tax 
liability of$18,000 for the married couple who filed separately ([$30,000 X 
10%] + [$30,000 X 20%]) X 2. If each spouse's taxable income were 
combined on one jointly filed tax return, the couple's federal tax liability 
income would be $24,000 (($30,000 X 10%] + [$60,000 X 20%] + 
[$30,000 X 30%]) or $6,000 more in federal tax liability because the couple 
was not able to take advantage of the "income-splitting" effects of each 
spouse filing individually and the benefits of the progressive rate schedule. 
Each Spouse Filed Own Return 
Spouse I $30,000 X 10% = $3,000 
30,000 X 20% = 6,000 
Spouse 2 30,000 X 10% = 3,000 
30.000 X 20% = 6.000 
Spouses Filed Joint Return 
Spouse 1 $30,000 X 10% =3,000 
30,000 X 20% =6,000 
Spouse 2 30,000 X 20% = 6,000 
Total Tl 120,000 Total Tax 18,000 Total Tl 
Additional Tax 
30.000 X 30%= 9.000 
120,000 Total Tax 24,000 
6,000 
The benefits of each spouse filing his or her own tax return were obvious: a 
$6,000 tax savings, due to the ability of each spouse to compute his or her 
tax starting at the lowest tax rate whereas if the married couple elected to 
file jointly and combine both incomes on one jointly filed tax return, the 
second spouse's $60,000 of taxable income begins to be taxed at 20% (the 
first $30,000 of it) and not at I 0% as for the separately filing spouses, for an 
additional tax of $3,000. And, the last $30,000 of taxable income of the 
second spouse in the couple filing the joint return is taxed at 30%, not 20% 
as for the separately filing couple, for an additional tax of$3,000 on that 
layer of income; a total additional tax of $6,000 for the jointly filing couple. 
See note 81 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the mandatory 
effect of the progressive tax rate structure on the second earner's taxable 
income for the married filing jointly category under current federal tax law. 
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38 Jd. 
39 Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl in TAX STORIES 27 5, at 279 (Paul L. 
Caron ed. 2003) [hereinafter cited as Cain, The Story of Earl]. 
40 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family at 1400. 
41 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 at 113 (March 1930). 
42 281 U.S. Ill (1930). 
43 ld. at 114. 
44 And the famous fruit and tree metaphor: " ... we think that no distinction 
can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which 
the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Jd. 
45 Bittker, Taxation and the Family at 1401. There is disagreement in the 
literature as to whether the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl was trying to 
protect the progressive rate schedule. Compare Bittker, Federal Income 
Taxation and the Family at 1402-03 ("the common notion that the principle 
of Lucas v. Earl, as applied to married couples was an essential buttress to 
the progressive rate schedule is fallacious.") with Cain, The Story of Earl at 
279 ("[t]he government's concern in Earl, never explicitly mentioned by 
Holmes, was protection of the progressive rate structure. If an agreement to 
shift income results in the undermining ofprogressivity, that agreement 
should be ignored by the tax collector regardless of the taxpayer's innocent 
non-tax avoidance motives"). See note 37 supra and accompanying 
example for the benefits of splitting income, filing separately and the 
concomitant advantages of the progressive rate schedule. 
46 Kornhauser, Love, Marriage, & the IRS at 73. 
47 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 10 I at 117 (November 1930). In Poe, the Court 
explained that although California also bad a community property regime, a 
California wife's interest in community property amounts to a mere 
expectancy continent on her husband's death and does not rise to level of a 
present interest. This was also the position of the Attorney General and the 
Treasury Department in denying husbands and wives the privilege of 
making separate returns of one-half of the community income in California, 
but according that privilege to residents of other community property states. 
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Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 at 113-14 and notes 3 and 4 and 
accompanying text. Hence, the different results in Lucas v. Earl and Poe v. 
Seaborn. The other community property states which gave the wife a 
"vested interest" in one-half of all community income, resulting in each 
spouse reporting and paying tax separately on his or her half share, were 
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. 
Bittker, Taxation and the Family at 1406. 
48 Kornhauser, Love, Marriage, & the IRS at 80-91 (based on empirical 
studies, Professor Kornhauser found that control of the money generally 
still resides with the earner; thus she argues that the owner should be the 
taxable unit, not the married couple); but see Cain, The Story of Earl 276-79 
(the earner may not be entitled to the income, for various reasons, 
[e.g.,junior associate in a law firm brings in earnings far in excess of his or 
her salary] and Professor Cain states that we do not tax the earner in those 
instances). 
It is interesting to pause here for a moment and reflect upon what the Earls 
tried to accomplish with their marital contract in 1901 : they established a 
marital regime of equal ownership and equal control of their joint income 
such that their contract equalized each spouse's financial position within the 
marital unit. Bittker, Taxation and the Family at 1402. If the Earl' s marital 
contract bad been upheld by the Supreme Court, it would have not only 
provided for income splitting of the Mr. Earl's earned income, but it would 
have done so in a way that would have required the Earls to equalize their 
ownership of the income inter se (and for subsequent taxpayers as well). !d. 
This is a far cry better than what Congress achieved in 1948 when it enacted 
the married filing jointly rate structure and pure income splitting between 
married taxpayers. !d. 
49 282 U.S. 101 (November 1930). 
50 !d. at 109. 
51 Jd 
52 !d. 
53 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation ,-r 35.01; Bittker, Federal Income 
Taxation and the Family at 1407. 
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54 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation ,-r 35.0l(emphasis added) citing Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 ( 1930). See also note 4 7 supra and 
accompanying text. 
55 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family at 1408. 
56 !d. See e.g. of Adam and Anna and Betty and Bob part IV infra. So, in 
community property states, marriage usually reduced, and divorce 
increased, a couple's federal income taxes: marriage was not a tax-neutral 
event. 





62 323 u.s. 44 (1944). 
63 !d. at 46 (1944); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation ,-r 35.02 
64 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46; Bittker, Federal Income 
Taxation ,-r 35.02. 
65 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation ,-r 35 .02. 
66 !d. 
67 !d. 
68 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family at 1412-13 . With the 
tax disparity between community property and common-law property 
largely eliminated, the new community property states lost their taste for 
Spanish law and repealed their statutes. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation at 
,-r 35.02. Thus, each spouse was presumed to earn one-half of the couple's 
taxable income and tax was computed as if each spouse filed individually. 
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Accordingly, each couple was given the advantages of income-splitting and 
the progressive rate schedule. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
69 Jd. at 1413. 
70 Jd. In 1940, the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 
(1940) extended the assignment of income doctrine to income from 
property. Taxpayers with investment income could shift the tax liability for 
that income to their spouses or children as long as they were willing to give 
up ownership of the underlying income-producing property (securities, bank 
account, rental real estate, etc.). Bittker, Federal income Taxation and the 
Family at 1401. Consequently there was a distinction between the taxation 
of earned income and investment income from 1940 until 1948 when 
Congress established the joint filing structure and allowed for income 
splitting between spouses. Jd. Professor Bittker notes that even though 
most income and deduction items were aggregated as a result of the 
enactment of the 1948 joint return, many tax provisions continued to treat 
husband and wife as separate individuals even if they filed a joint return. 
Id. at 1414-1416. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
71 
Debbie's Tax Spouses' Tax 
Taxable Income Tax Taxable Income Tax Add'l Tax 
$10,000 X 0% = $ 0 Spouse 1 $10,000 X 0% = $ 0 
20,000 X 15% = 3,000 15,000 X 15% = 2,250 $ 750 
20.000 X 30% = 6.000 Spouse 2 10,000 X 0% = 0 
15,000 X 15% = 2.250 3,750 
50,000 9,000 50,000 4,500 
Additonal Tax: Singles' Penalty/Marriage Bonus: $4,500 
72 For Adam and Anna, who had $50,000 of taxable income all earned by 
Adam, there would have been a marriage bonus as well because under the 
1948 scheme, Adam would have bad a $9,000 tax liability ifhe had been 
single like Debbie. Adam's marriage to Anna gave Adam the opportunity of 
splitting his income with her under the joint return regime and having the 
same tax liability, $4,500, as Betty and Bob, who each actually had $25,000 
of taxable income. 
As explained by Dorothy Brown: A marriage bonus occurs whenever a 
couple pays lower federal income taxes as a result of marriage than they 
would pay if they remained single and filed individual returns. Marriage 
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bonuses are the greatest where there is only one wage earner. Dorothy A. 
Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 787, 787 (1997). 
73 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation 44.02(5]. Congress responded to 
the third of these complaints in 1951 and 1954 by enacting the special rate 
schedule for heads of households and allowing surviving spouses to use the 
joint return rates for two years following the deceased spouse's death. Jd. 
For a further discussion of the validity of the economic justifications for the 
disparity in taxation between married couples and single persons, see 
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family at 1420-26; Kornhauser, 
Love, Money, & the IRS at 96-100. 
74 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation 44.02[5]. Although in intervening 
years, the ceiling has changed on the percentage by which a single 
taxpayer's tax liability on a particular amount of taxable income may 
exceed the tax liability of a married couple filing jointly with the same 
taxable income, the principles of the 1969 relationship of the rate schedules 
are still manifest in IRC § I. !d. 
75 Again, as explained by Dorothy Brown: A marriage penalty occurs 
whenever a couple pays higher federal income taxes as a result of their 
marriage than they would pay if they remained single and filed individual 
returns. Marriage penalties are the greatest where there are two wage 
earners. Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and 
White, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 787, 787 (1997). 
76 Jd. Pub. L. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1144 (2004), Working Families Tax Relief 
Act of2004 [hereinafter cited as WFTRA 2004] eliminated the marriage 
penalties in the standard deduction and in the 15 percent bracket for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 2003 for taxpayers filing joint returns. 
Thus, for tax years beginning on January I, 2004 and through December 31, 
2010, the joint return standard deduction is 200 percent of the standard 
deduction for unmarried taxpayers, IRC § 63(c)(2),and the upper limit of 
the 15 percent rate bracket for married couples filing joint returns is 200 
percent of the upper limit of the 15 percent rate bracket for unmarried 
taxpayers, IRC § I (t)(8)(B). 
77 (Except for 2004 through 2010 for the 15 percent bracket as explained in 
note 76 supra). Bittker, Federal Income Taxation 44.02[5]. And 
because Congress recognized that these married taxpayers would probably 
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notice this phenomenon, it barred married taxpayers from filing separate 
returns using the new singles rate structure. Instead, married taxpayers who 
wish to file separate tax returns are subject to a special married filing 
separately rate schedule, IRC § l(d). Id. 
78 See notes 72 and 75 supra and accompanying text. The penalty results 
from pursuing three policies: (1) equal taxes for all equal-income married 
couples; (2) a smaller differential between single and married persons than 
was provided by "pure" income splitting from 1948 to 1969; and (3) a 
progressive rate structure. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation 44.02[5]. 
It should be noted that these objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. 
Jd. 
79 I d. 51 percent of married couples received a marriage bonus of $1 ,300 
and 42 percent paid a marriage penalty of $1 ,400, and 6 percent were 
unaffected. Under the basic measure of the marriage penalty, couples paid a 
total of about $4 billion Jess in taxes than they would have if they were 
required to file as individuals. Congressional Budget Office, For Better or 
Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax at 29-30 (1997) [hereinafter 
cited as CBO Study]. 
80 Thomas R. Pope, Kenneth E. Anderson, John L. Kramer, Prentice Hall's 
Federal Taxation 2006 Comprehensive at front right inside cover 
(Pearson/Prentice Hall 2006). 
81 In this particular example, the "second earner's" taxable income does not 
have the advantage he or she had when single of having the first dollar of 
taxable income taxed at 10%; instead the first dollar of the second earner's 
taxable income is taxed at the marginal rate that applied to the last dollar of 
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